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Key provisions of the Texas TANF waiver,
ABSTRACT
Achieving Change for Texans (ACT), allowed the state to implement
variable time limits, sanctions, and geographically-targeted work
assistance programs. An innovative aspect of ACT was the
provision that the state's variable time limits did not begin until a
case was notified of an available slot in the job assistance program.
Thus, state time limits were directly linked with the provision ofjob
services while sanction penalties were applicable to the entire
caseload. In this paper, we examine the time limit and sanction
effects on the duration of cash assistance for all families that entered
the caseload from January 1997 to September 1999. The findings
suggest that nonrnetropolitan families are more likely to be
sanctioned and have longer spell durations than metropolitan
families. In both areas, the imposition of sanctions and state time
limits increased the likelihood of exiting the caseload.
When welfare reform legislation was enacted in 1996, opponents
expressed concerns that a lack of employment opportunities would
cause the most vulnerable families to exhaust their time limits without
finding work, leaving them with neither employment nor cash
assistance. In the post-reform period, however, it appears that sanctions
have removed many families long before the expiration of their time
limits (Goldberg and Schott 2000; Cherlin et al. 2001). This would
suggest that, in the short run, sanctions rather than time limits present
the greater potential threat to the safety net for vulnerable families.
However, our understanding of how the various welfare reform rules
are impacting the caseload is incomplete. Although time limits and
sanctions aim at the same end result, they operate differently (Pavetti
and Bloom 2000), and we know little about how time limits and
sanctions might interplay to differentially affect particular groups or
Published by eGrove, 2002
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places.
Demographic, socioeconomic, and economic differences
between urban and rural areas result in place-based differences in
poverty (Rural Sociological Society Task Force 1993). Following
welfare reform, these differences are particularly important for
nonmetropolitan areas because the rural poor may face substantial
problems in obtaining access to the economic opportunities necessary to
rise from poverty and dependence and may lack access to the
infrastructure and services necessary for successful transitions from
welfare. For example, areas with lower population density tend to be
more remote from urban centers and have higher costs for the provision
of services, such as work training programs, than metropolitan areas
(RUPRI 1999).
In this article, we examine the use of sanctions and time limits
in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program in
Texas. Benefits reductions due to sanctions and time limits have been
applied concurrently in the Texas TANF caseload, and this provides an
opportunity to compare and contrast the use of these two enforcement
tools across a broad range of recipient groups and geographic areas.
The analysis examines the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan caseloads
in Texas during the period from January 1997 to September 1999. This
period coincides with the full implementation of the state's variable
time limits and job assistance programs. The main questions address
issues of locational differences in the application of sanctions and time
limits within the state.
Background

Following years of bipartisan discontentment with the welfare system,
the U.S. Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996. In a major
philosophical shift, the legislation embraced the idea of an
employment-based safety net as a viable alternative to the cash-based
system that prevailed for some 60 years (Danziger 1998). Although
work-oriented welfare has been tried in the past, earlier programs were
characterized by numerous exemptions and generous definitions of
employment activities. Not only are the work provisions of PRWORA
applied more comprehensively than in earlier programs, the legislation
also contains incentives aimed at enforcing the work rules. Among the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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more important incentives are time limits on the receipt of cash
assistance and sanctions for noncompliance with the rules of welfare
reform. Time limits and sanctions aim to modifjl behaviors associated
with welfare dependency by "raising the stakes" for welfare recipients
because each creates a negative financial consequence for not following
program requirements (Holcomb et al. 1998).
When welfare reform was being discussed in the early 1990s, it
was the time limit provision rather than sanctions that drew the most
attention. Although sanctions in one form or another had long been
used in the cash assistance program, time limits had never been applied
to the public assistance program for families and children (Holcomb et
al. 1998; Moffitt and Pavetti 1998; Swartz and Kaplan 1997). Not only
are time limits novel, under PRWORA, there is no explicit linkage
between time limits and work effort, and there are no provisions for
those unable to find employment. Consequently, once time limits
expire, there is no opportunity for a recipient to work in exchange for
public assistance (Danziger 1998; Pavetti 1995). Also, the work-first
orientation of PRWORA severely limits the substitution of education
and training for work. Taken together, these program characteristics
raise the possibility that a recipient could expend time limits without
attaining employment or the necessary skills to obtain employment. As
such, time limits were viewed as the key factor underlying the predicted
demise of the social safety net.
To underpin these concerns about time limits, there was
research which indicated that a relatively high percentage of current
recipients accumulated more than 60 months of welfare receipt,
suggesting that large numbers of households would exhaust their time
limits (Duncan, Harris and Boisjoly 1997; Pavetti 1996). Furthermore,
a number of labor market studies suggested either: ( I ) that there would
not be enough jobs to absorb the number of clients affected by welfare
reform (Bernstein 1997); or (2) that even when available, most jobs
would not pay enough to raise clients above the poverty level (Blank
1994; Burtless 1997). An additional body of research indicated a
significant percentage of welfare recipients possessed barriers to
employment because of health and psychological problems, low
educational attainment levels, and other personal characteristics
(Hershey and Pavetti 1997; Loprest and Acs 1996). Also, while the
federal legislation specified a maximum of 60 months of benefits, it
permitted the states to set shorter limits, and many did so. Given the
Published by eGrove, 2002
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novelty of time limits and the available evidence, there were fears that
the most vulnerable recipients would be hardest hit by time limits.
In spite ofthese early concerns that time limits would mark the
undoing of the safety net for the least capable welfare recipients, this
has not occurred. One reason for this lack of impact is that the large
scale expiration oftime limits did not begin until the latter part of 2001
because the majority of states adopted the 60 month federal time limits.
Also, evidence shows that many clients are expending their time limits
more slowly than expected and that some of the states with shorter time
limits (i.e., less than 60 months) have granted benefits extensions to
affected clients (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Furthermore, welfare
reform coincided with a period of sustained economic expansion and
unprecedented caseload decline. As such, many recipients left the
caseload for employment before the expiration of their time limits.
Although time limits have not had their predicted impact on the
nation's caseload, survey data indicate that sanctions have affected
relatively large numbers of welfare recipients. For example, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that in 1998, in an
average month, 112,700 families or about 4.5 percent of TANF
caseloads were under a sanction (GAO 2000). Goldberg and Schott
(2000) find that, through 1999, sanctions account for three times more
case closures than time limits. Research also suggests that sanctions are
having a disproportionate impact on cases with greater barriers to selfsufficiency. For example, Goldberg and Schott (2000) review the
recent literature on sanction studies and find that sanctioned recipients
typically have lower educational and work skill levels, less work
experience, a greater prevalence of health problems, and other barriers
such as the lack of child care and transportation. In an ongoing three
city survey, Cherlin et al. (2001) find that sanctioned clients were more
vulnerable than nonsanctioned TANF recipients. When compared to
nonsanctioned recipients, the sanctioned recipients exhibited the
following characteristics: fewer had a high school education; more had
health problems; more experienced low monthly incomes; more
reported food insecurity; fewer had employment experience in the prior
two years; fewer had a telephone at home; fewer owned an automobile;
more had used marijuana or hard drugs in the prior 12 months; more
reported poor housing quality, and more lived in neighborhoods
characterized by undesirable conditions such as crime and abandoned
housing (Cherlin et al. 2001). Other research has found a high
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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correspondence between sanctions and child welfare risk (Shook 1999),
and a strong association between being sanctioned and leaving the
caseload (Fein and Kanveit 1997). There is also evidence that once off
the caseload, sanctioned recipients have lower wages and fewer hours
of employment than nonsanctioned recipients (GAO 2000).
Consequently, it appears that sanctions removed many of the more
vulnerable families long before they reached the end of their time
limits.
Earlier research has shown that, even in the absence of
behavioral tools such as sanctions and time limits, women with higher
endowments of human capital generally leave welfare on their own
(O'Neill, Bassi and Wolf 1987). To the extent this is true, then it is
likely that these already self-motivated recipients would be less likely to
receive sanctions for noncompliance and would be more likely to exit
the caseload before the expiration of their time limits. With the
persistence of this type of exit selectivity, the caseload increasingly
would consist of the least advantaged recipients, that is, those with the
lowest levels of human capital accumulation. However, the survey
evidence reviewed above suggests that it is these less educated
recipients who are most prone to sanctions. Thus, the possibilityexists
that time limits are drawing out the more advantaged recipients even as
sanctions are pushing out the more vulnerable recipients.
Moffitt (1999) provides the framework and rationale for
distinguishing differential policy impacts. Two hypothetical outcomes
can occur from reform policy. The first, which can be called the labor
market attachment model, occurs when a work-oriented policy draws
the more highly-skilled into employment. The second possible
outcome is that sanctions and penalties force out those least able to
comply with the work requirement. The latter can be called the
sanction model. Moffitt (1999) offers some support for this kind of
differential impact, finding that waivers had their strongest impact on
women with less than 12 years of education. Waivers lowered the
welfare participation rate for this group by 1.7 percent, compared to a
0.9 percent decline for those with a high school education. However,
Moffitt (1999) does not explicitly test the labor market attachment and
sanction hypotheses.
The behavioral contents of time limits and sanctions might
explain the existence of differential policy impacts. It has been
suggested that time limits might reduce the stigma associated with
Published by eGrove, 2002
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welfare receipt (Swartz and Kaplan 1997). This reduction in stigma
would occur because time limits reinforce the goal of self-sufficient
employment and, as such, legitimize the receipt of temporary assistance
in pursuit of this goal. It is possible, then, that sanctions might increase
the stigma associated with welfare receipt. That is, compared to the
initiation of time limits, the imposition of a sanction is more punitive
and has a more negative behavioral message. As such, time limits and
sanctions might have differential impacts because of differences in the
perception of welfare stigma as well as differences in human capital
characteristics.
In spite of the lack of empirical evidence, there are differences
in the content and implementation of time limits and sanctions that
suggest the possibility of differential impacts. Although time limits and
sanctions share the same broad goal of replacing welfare with work,
these two behavioral tools operate differently and convey distinct
messages to recipients (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Time limits place a
cap on the receipt of cash benefits. For example, federal time limits
specify a maximum lifetime cumulative total of 60 months of benefits
receipt. The behavioral content of time limits is ambiguous, not aiming
to reward or punish any particular action. Rather, time limits
emphasize the temporary nature of public assistance, and the message
of time limits is that welfare receipt is not a permanent entitlement.
Consequently, time limits function proactively, seeking to guide future
behavior away from welfare receipt and toward self-sufficient
employment.
Sanctions represent a monetary penalty for noncompliance with
a particular requirement and have a more specific behavioral content
than time limits. Under contemporary welfare reform, states use
sanctions to enforce a variety of particular behaviors including the
fulfillment of the employment requirement, ensuring school attendance,
cooperation with child support collection efforts, attaining child
immunizations, discouraging drug and alcohol abuse, and having
clients attend parenting classes. The message of sanctions is that
welfare receipt is conditioned upon mutual obligation, and this idea is
reinforced through the withholding of assistance for noncompliance. In
contrast to time limits, sanctions always are applied retroactively to
correct past behavior. Consequently, although sanctions might not
impose the long run financial burden of exhausted time limits, these
penalties can produce significant short term economic distress,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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particularly if their causes and consequences are unanticipated or not
understood by a recipient.
In addition to differences in the behavioral content of time
limits and sanctions, there appear to be enforcement differences,
suggesting that variations in bureaucratic procedures affect policy
outcomes. Survey evidence indicates that a large percentage of
sanctions occur for procedural reasons, such as a missed appointment,
rather than the failure to comply with the major requirements of welfare
reform (Cherlin et al. 2001). By contrast, in many states with short
term time limits, extensions have been granted to clients who exceed
the limit (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Consequently, the selective
treatment of time limits and sanctions by administrators and
caseworkers could exacerbate any existing differentials among recipient
types.
Viewed as a whole, the literature suggests that time limits and
sanctions function differently. Though limited, the evidence indicates
that sanctions might be having a disproportionate impact on those
clients with lower levels of human capital endowment. To the extent
that either time limits or sanctions are associated with the stigmatization
of welfare receipt, the literature of rural welfare receipt suggests that
nonmetropolitan areas would be more impacted by welfare reform
measures than metropolitan areas. That is, research on the locational
aspects of public assistance indicates that there is a greater stigma
attached to welfare receipt in rural areas (Fitzgerald 1995; Hirschl and
Rank 1991; Vartanian 1999). To the extent, then, that time limits and
sanctions differentially impact welfare caseload declines through
stigma, we would expect to find these differences in the comparison of
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan caseloads.
In summary, there is theoretical and empirical support for the
idea that the two behavioral tools of welfare reform - time limits and
sanctions - might differentially impact recipients. Also, to the extent
that time limits and sanctions impact welfare stigma, the literature
suggests that these welfare reform measures would impact metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan areas differently. However, the evidence for such
differential impacts is suggestive rather than conclusive. Although
cases experiencing time limits and sanctions are subsets of a much
larger caseload, it is important to understand the caseload dynamics of
these recipients. Time limits and sanctions are the primary tools for
enforcing compliance with the work requirements of welfare reform.
Published by eGrove, 2002
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Congress must decide whether to reauthorize PRWORA in 2002.
Among other things, this will involve the consideration of whether to
maintain the current system of time limits and sanctions. Presently, our
knowledge of how time limits and sanctions impact the caseload
remains limited, and this makes it difficult to identify needed policy
changes (Pavetti and Bloom 2000). A first step is to determine whether
and, if so, how these enforcement tools might differentially impact
particular segments of the caseload.

Welfare Reform In Texas
Texas is among the 43 states that received federal waivers for the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program prior to the
passage of PRWORA in 1996 (Rosewater 1997). After the enactment
of federal welfare reform legislation, states had the option to administer
TANF under the terms of their waivers. Texas chose to operate its
TANF Program using its Achieving Change for Texans (ACT) waiver.
Although both the federal legislation and ACT are based on the use of
time limits and sanctions to move recipients from welfare to work, the
Texas provisions differ in several important ways.
One of the more significant differences between federal and
Texas TANF policy is the treatment of time limits. PRWORA permits
a maximum of 60 months of benefits receipt. Once the federal limits
are exceeded, both the adults and children on the case face a lifetime
bar on the receipt of further federally-funded cash assistance. Under
ACT, there are three tiers oftime limits, 12,24, and 36 months, that are
based on the educational level and work experience of recipients. If
time limits are exceeded under ACT, the adult faces a five year freezeout period but children on the case can continue to receive cash
assistance. Although federal time limits begin with the receipt of cash
assistance, the Texas time limits begin when a recipient is notified of an
opening in the employment services program. Thus, although the
Texas time limits are shorter than 60 months, the Texas time clock is
activated by work services outreach rather than benefits receipt. This
policy changed in October 1999 so that each subsequent month of
benefit receipt in Texas has counted toward the federal time of 60
months, regardless of whether the client was subject to state time limits
(TWC 2000).
As for sanctions, the federal law is rather broad, requiring that
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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states withhold at least a part of a case's grant for noncompliance with
either the work or child support enforcement requirements (~herlin'et
al. 2001 ; Pavetti and Bloom 2000). Texas goes beyond this minimum
by expanding the number of behavioral requirements subject to
financial penalty. The behaviors subject to sanctions are elements of a
personal responsibility agreement that all recipients must sign in order
to establish eligibility for cash assistance. Although a broad base of
behaviors are subject to sanctions, ACT does not penalize the entire
case. Consequently, although Texas has a greater range of behaviors
subject to penalties than many other states, the financial impact of
sanctions ranges from a minimum of $25 to the full amount of the
parent's recognized portion of the grant.
Another factor affecting the use of time limits and sanctions in
Texas is the state's exemption policy. Federal law permits the
exemption of up to 20 percent of the TANF caseload from the 60
month time limit. As have most states, Texas provides such
exemptions to individuals on the basis of personal characteristics such
as illness, incapacity, and pregnancy. However, Texas also maintains
geographical exemptions based on economic deprivation andlor the
lack of employment services. Geographical exemptions are granted at
the county level. For the most part, these areas are sparsely populated,
nonmetropolitan counties with limited employment opportunities.
Persons that are exempted either for personal or geographic reasons are
not subject to sanctions related to work requirements. They are,
however, subject to sanctions based on the non-employment
requirements of the personal responsibility agreement. Exempt
recipients can volunteer for work services and, in doing so, will initiate
the state's time limits.
The review of the literature suggested that variations in the
content and enforcement of time limits and sanctions might
differentially impact welfare recipients. Texas exemplifies such
variations with its heterogeneous patterns of policy administration for
time limits and sanctions. Also, Texas is characterized by demographic
and regional diversity, which would compound the potential for
differential policy impacts. Therefore, to the extent that the two
primary behavioral tools of welfare reform can have variable impacts
on people and places, it is expected that these variations will be
exemplified in the Texas TANF caseload.
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Research Design
The primary questions addressed in this article examine time limit and
sanction effects on the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan TANF
caseloads in Texas. Have time limits and sanctions been applied
uniformly across the state TANF caseload? Does lower human capital
skills affect the likelihood that a case will be sanctioned? How has the
imposition of time limits and sanctions affected the duration of cash
assistance and the likelihood of exiting the caseload? Finally, what
does this suggest for the future viability of the welfare safety net in
Texas?
In order to study the characteristics of the TANF caseload in
Texas, a longitudinal file was constructed from administrative data files
of all TANF recipients. The data were obtained by the Center for
Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education from the
Texas Department of Human Services. When completed, the
longitudinal data set contained records for all clients who have received
TANF during the 33 months from January 1997 through September
1999, a period that coincides with the implementation of ACT within
the state. The case-level longitudinal file used in the analysis of this
report was extracted from this longitudinal client-level database. The
variables used in the analysis include demographic and household
controls and programmatic variables that are expected to affect welfare
spells and the likelihood of incurring a sanction. We first define the
variables used in the statistical analysis and then discuss the
methodology.

Demographic and Household Characteristics
Age and racelethnicity are two demographic control variables
examined. Age is measured as the case head's age at the beginning of
the spell and is used as a continuous variable in the event history
models. The racelethnicity of the household head is a category variable
divided into five categories: Anglo, Black, Hispanic, American Indian,
and Asian.
Human capital characteristics such as education level and work
experience are examined using the ACT assigned tier level. When
notified ofthe availability ofemployment services, the client is limited
to 12, 24, or 36 months of cash assistance depending on the tier
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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classification. Tier 1 clients classified in the 12 month tier have a high
school diploma or have worked 18 or more of the previous 24 months.
Tier 2 clients in the 24 month tier have completed the 1 lth grade or
have worked 6 to 17 months of the previous 24 months. All other
clients with less education and lower work experience levels are limited
to 36 months and are classified in the third tier. In the analysis, we
examine these effects as categorical variables.
Household characteristics examined are family characteristics,
medical incapacity, and metropolitan status. Family characteristics are
age of youngest child, number of children, and the number of adults
certified on the case. The age of the youngest child is coded in
categorical form to distinguish those cases with a certified child who is
under five years of age from those with children of older ages. The
number of children and the number of adults is the number considered
in the TANF benefit calculation. Physical incapacity is measured as a
physical or medical incapacity of the case head or another adult or a
child within the household that requires the case head to attend to their
needs. Metropolitan status is determined using the standard
classification of Texas counties based on the Census Bureau's 1992
classification of metropolitan areas. Texas has 58 metropolitan
counties and 196 nonmetropolitan counties. The metropolitan status of
a case is based on the county of residence for the family.

TANF Case Characteristics
Programmatic variables examined include the percentage of cases that
have been notified that their TANF benefit clock has started, a control
variable for the 87 counties targeted in Texas's welfare reform, and
penalty sanctions. Under the Texas TANF waiver, ACT allowed
flexibility in the imposition of time-limits for a case that is conditioned
on the availability ofjobs as well as employment services to assist the
client. Thus, time-limited cash assistance does not begin until the client
receives notification of the availability of employment services for
assistance. As such, each county caseload will have different
proportions of the caseload that have began time-limited assistance in
the post-reform period.
Another important programmatic variable that is comparable to
the state waiver categorical measure used in other studies (e.g., Blank
2001) is the implementation stages of ACT. Initially, mandatory work
Published by eGrove, 2002
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was required of approximately 90 percent of the state caseload that
resided in 87 of Texas's 254 counties. These counties were targeted to
lead the implementation of employment assistance programs and were
dispersed across the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas of the
state. All 27 metropolitan central city counties were included in the
original 87 counties. The rest of the original implementation counties
include 83.9 percent of the metropolitan suburban, 19.0 percent of the
nonmetropolitan adjacent, and 14.7 percent of the nonmetropolitan
non-adjacent counties. The other 167 counties contained less than10
percent of the total state caseload and were classified as minimal
service and geographically exempt counties during the period examined
in this research.
The final programmatic variables examined are the sanction
penalties within the state. There are eight different types of penalties
under ACT with varying sanction amounts and duration (TWC 1999).
Seven types of penalty sanctions may affect a case regardless of
participation in the CHOICES program, while the eighth type only
affects those cases that have begun the state time limits and increases in
severity for each violation of the CHOICES program. The sanctions
outside of the CHOICES program participation cover a broad range of
behaviors such as children's school attendance, childhood
immunizations, medical and dental checkups, child support and
paternity establishment, parenting classes, and controlled substance and
alcohol abuse. In the sanction model, the dependent variable is the
duration until any of the eight types of sanctions. In the spell duration
model, the sanction variable is a categorical variable indicating a
penalty for any of the eight types.

Methodology
The analysis was completed using basic descriptive statistics and event
history analysis techniques. The descriptive analysis is based on the
full monthly caseload where the case has at least one certified adult.
This excludes child-only cases because they are exempt from many of
the welfare reform measures. For TANF-UP (Unemployed Parent)
cases, the characteristics of the parent designated as the case head are
used. The statistical analysis consists of two different event history
models examining the duration until a case receives its first sanction
and the duration until the case exits the TANF caseload.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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Event history analysis is the study of the probability of events
occurring at particular points in time (Allison 1995). Since we have
independent variables that change over time, also known as timedependent covariates, we use the proportional hazard model or Cox
regression for semiparametric models. To estimate this model, the
PROC PHREG in SAS was used with ties handled using the Breslow
method (Allison 1995). Using this method, we examine the effect that
the independent variables have on the hazard that a case will receive its
first sanction or exit the caseload. Duration spells are measured in
months. The event history models examine only the first spell ofthose
cases that enter the caseload from January 1997 through September
1999. For the TANF spell duration model, cases are right censored if
they remain on the TANF caseload in October 1999, and the variables
in the model are fixed at their initial status values except for state time
limits and penalty sanctions, which covary with time. For the sanction
model, cases are right censored if they remain on the TANF caseload in
October 1999 or exit without any penalty sanctions, and state time
limits covaries with time while all other model variables are fixed at
initial status.
Using event history analysis with time-dependent covariates,
the proportional hazard rate at time, t, depends on the values of the
independent variables at the same time, t. Thus, when we interpret
results from the event history model we discuss the increasing or
decreasing effects the independent variables have on the proportional
hazard rate. An understandable way to interpret the coefficients in
event history analysis is to examine the risk ratio (Allison 1995). The
risk ratio is calculated as the exponential of the parameter value. By
using the formula 100*(risk ratio-1), we can discuss the effect of unit
changes in the independent variable in relation to percent changes in
the proportional hazard rate (Allison 1995). In other words, using the
risk ratio calculation, the results of the event history models can be
discussed in terms of unit changes in the independent variable and the
corresponding percentage change in the likelihood that a case will be
sanctioned or exit the caseload.

Findings
During the period of ACT, there was a 56.1 percent decline in the metropolitan caseload and a 4 1.4 percent decline in the nonmetropolitan
Published by eGrove, 2002
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caseload. Overall, the total state TANF caseload had a 53.5 percent
decline in the number of cases with at least one certified adult. The
substantial decline from January 1997 to September 1999 is evident in
both urban and rural areas in Texas, but the slower decline rate in rural
areas has resulted in an increase in the overall proportion of the state
caseload that resides in rural counties. The proportion of the state
TANF caseload that resides in nonmetropolitan areas in Texas
increased from 17.2 percent in January 1997 to 21.7 percent in
September 1999. Although rural areas have had a substantial decline, it
has not kept pace with the decline rate in urban areas. The discussion
proceeds by describing the rate of implementation of sanctions and state
time limits within metropolitan and nonrnetropolitan areas of the state
and is followed by results of the event history models.
Sanction and Time Limit Patterns

The rate of implementation of the state's time-limited benefits varied
considerably between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. As
shown in Figure 1, beginning in January 1998 and continuing through
September 1999, the gap between urban and rural cases with time
limits is more than 40 percent. The continuation of this gap is such that
in September 1999 the metropolitan caseload has 72.1 percent of its
caseload on the state's time limited benefits while the nonrnetropolitan
caseload has 30.1 percent. This is a net difference of 42.0 percent
between urban and rural areas in the proportions of the caseload
receiving any job assistance services. This suggests that the provision
of services to assist in the transition from welfare to work varies
depending on where a client resides within the state with more services
available to a larger proportion of the metropolitan caseload.
In comparison, however, the rate at which the caseload is
subject to sanction penalties is relatively similar between the two area
caseloads. As shown in Figure 2, the gap between metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas is less than 10 percent during the entire period.
Considering the substantial gap between the caseload proportions
receiving job services, this relatively small gap in the sanctioning rate
suggests that sanctions are being applied more evenly in metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan areas. Taken together, these findings suggest that
sanctions are being applied uniformly across the state caseload while
state time limits and job assistance have more locational variation.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss1/4
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Figure 1: P e r c e n t of T A N F C a s e l o a d with State T i m e LimitslJob Assistance
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F i g u r e 2: P e r c e n t o f T A N F C a s e l o a d w i t h P e n a l t y S a n c t i o n
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Duration until Filst Sanction
In first column of Table 1, the results of the Cox regression on the
duration until a case's first penalty sanction for the State of Texas are
presented. The findings suggest that the likelihood of a case receiving a
sanction increases if a case has lower human capital, has begun state
time-limited benefits, resides in one of the original 87 counties, or
resides in a nonmetropolitan county. Cases that are classified in the
second educationlwork tier are 12.6 percent more likely to receive a
sanction than cases in the first tier, and cases in the third tier are 23.7
percent more likely. These findings suggest that recipients with lower
education levels and work experience may be more likely to
misunderstand the "new rules" surrounding welfare reform and to be
penalized with monetary sanctions.
Furthermore, cases in
nonmetropolitan counties are 7.7 percent more likely to receive a
sanction than metropolitan cases.
Table 2 examines the results for the sanction models for
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas as separate models. In
metropolitan areas, cases in the second tier are 12.0 percent and cases
in the third tier are 2 1.9 percent more likely to receive a sanction than
cases in the first tier. In nonmetropolitan areas, cases in the second and
third tiers have a greater disadvantage than the first tier with a 20.0
percent increase for the second tier and a 38.9 percent increase for the
third tier. As such, sanctions have been applied disproportionately to
those with lower levels of human capital, and this selectivity is more
apparent in nonmetropolitan areas. Thus, for those in rural areas
possessing lower human capital skills is an even greater disadvantage.

TANF Spell Duration
The first column in Table 3 presents the proportional hazard model of
the TANF spell duration for the State of Texas. Beginning the state
time limited benefits increases the likelihood of exiting by 8.7 percent.
Receiving a sanction increases the likelihood of exiting by 22.4 percent.
This suggests that sanctions have a greater impact on the spell duration
than the state time limited benefits and the provision of job services.
Not surprisingly, cases classified in the second and third tiers have
longer expected durations than cases in the first tier. Residing in one of
the original 87 counties increases the likelihood of exiting by 7.8
Published by eGrove, 2002
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Table 1: Proportional Hazard Model of Duration until First
Penalty Sanction for TANF Cases Beginning New Spell from
January 1997 to September 1999 for the State of Texas.

Duration
7
1 Parameter Risk
1 1%
Standard
(0.0090)1
0.2125**
1 1.077'
(0.0079)
1
0.0740**
0.1
184**
5.12
126)
1.046
Incapacity
l . O 8(0.0634)
0 0 * * (0.017'7)
odWork
TierEstimate
3 -Ratio
Likelihood
60,024.98**
(0.0092)
Score-0.2996**
Counties
0 .4 (0.0471)
9(0.01
39 * 1*1) 54,770.21**
0.741
(0.0203)
1.639
1.0906**
2.976
Wald
47,681.47**
Child
Under
Age
5
-1.297~-~0=
ropolitan
County
er 2
Total Number of
Cases Adult 1
374,604 -0.2627*
Second
Censored Percentage
75.89
Average

.,,,

4

1

1

* -0.7691

p::iii:l
-

L

-

'

-

-

--

I

@O

7

Spell
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.0001
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographicand Socioeconomic Research
and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A& M University.
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Table 2: Proportional Hazard Model of Duration until First Penalty Sanction for TANF Cases Beginning New
Spell from January 1997 to September 1999 for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Counties in the State of Texas.

Inde~endentVariable
State Time Limits
EducatiodWork Tier 2
EducatiodWork Tier 3
Age
Number of Children
Child Under Age 5
Second Adult
Black
Hispanic
American Indian
Asian
Medical Incapacity
The 87 Counties
Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald
Total Number of Cases
Censored Percentage
Average Spell Duration
Published by eGrove, 2002

Parameter
Estimate
Metropolitan Counties

Standard
Error

1.0509**
0.1129**
0.1981**
-0.0145**
0.0736**
-1.3695**
-0.2076**
0.1051**
-0.0591 **
-0.0496
-0.3326**
-1.2137**
0.5825**
48,377.64**
44,010.31**
37,878.98**
302,25 1
73.77
5.05

(0.0121)
(0.0096)
(0.0084)
(0.0005)
(0.003 1)
(0.0095)
(0.0 157)
(0.0099)
(0.0101)
(0.0713)
(0.0477)
(0.0 199)
(0.0752)

19

Risk
Ratio

1
2.860
1.120
1.219
0.986
1.076
0.254
0.813
1.111
0.943
0.952
0.717
0.297
1.79 1

1
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Parameter
Estimate

Variable
l~nde~endent

Standard
Error

Risk
Ratio

Nonmetropolitan Counties
3.348
(0.0263)
State Time Limits
1.2083**
EducatiodWork Tier 2
0.1822**
(0.0264)
1.200
1.389
EducatiodWork Tier 3
0.3285**
(0.0222)
(0.001 3)
0.970
-0.0307**
Age
1.089
Number of Children
0.0856**
(0.0086)
0.426
Child Under Age 5
-0.8532**
(0.0230)
(0.0344)
0.602
Second Adult
-0.5068**
(0.0252)
1.186
Black
0.1709**
(0.023 1)
1.086
Hispanic
0.0824*
1.449
(0.1387)
American Indian
0.3712*
0.875
(0.3338)
Asian
-0.1335
0.630
(0.0391)
Medical Incapacity
-0.4623 **
1.437
The 87 Counties
(0.0258)
0.3626**
8,85 1.20**
Likelihood Ratio
Score
9,729.37**
Wald
8,445.14**
Total Number of Cases
72,353
Censored Percentage
84.72
A v e r a g e e l l Duration
5.41
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.0001
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education, Department of Rural
Sociology, Texas A&M University.
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percent. Cases in nonmetropolitan areas are 1.2 percent less likely to
exit than cases in metropolitan areas, holding all other variables
constant. These findings suggest that time limits and sanctions as well
as higher human capital skills increase the likelihood of exiting TANF.
Separate models for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas
are listed in Table 4. In metropolitan areas, cases with time-limited
benefits are 7.0 percent more likely to exit. Sanction penalties for the
metropolitan caseload have a 2 1.6 percent increase in the likelihood of
exiting the caseload. Sanction penalties for the nonmetropolitan
caseload have a 23.2 percent increase in the likelihood of exiting the
caseload. In nonmetropolitan areas, starting time-limited benefits
increases the likelihood of exiting 12.8 percent. These comparative
findings suggest that having state time-limited benefits and job-related
sanctions increase the likelihood of exiting the nonmetropolitan more
than the metropolitan caseload. Thus, the provision of job services
assists in moving cases off of welfare more quickly than those cases not
provided these services for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
caseloads. However, even though rural recipients are less likely to exit
overall, time limits and job-related sanctions are associated with greater
exit probabilities in the nonmetropolitan caseload. To the extent that
rural areas have less economic opportunity than urban areas, these
greater exit probabilities may be due to differences in the perception of
stigma.

Conclusions

The defining nature of a fixed block grant for TANF benefits allows
states many benefits as well as constraints. The foremost benefit is the
flexibility to be able to concentrate resources more efficiently and
effectively in areas with the greatest need. For example, targeted work
programs were initially implemented in 87 of the 254 counties in Texas
and provided assistance in counties that comprised approximately 90
percent of the total welfare caseload in the state. The resulting
constraints of a fixed block grant are the tradeoffs that are inherent with
business cycle fluctuations and with administrative overhead costs of
expanded service provisions. For example, during an economic
downturn, the number of families needing assistance could potentially
increase at the same time that the demand or need for additional job
Published by eGrove, 2002
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Table 3: Proportional Hazard Model of TANF Spell
Duration for Cases Beginning New Spell from January
1997 to September 1999 for the State of Texas.

1

, r v P a r a m e t e r ~ t a n d a r1
Estimate
Error
I State Time Limits
0.0837** I (0.0041)
i ~ e n a l t vsanction
1 0.2021 ** 1 (0.0049) 1
EducatiodWork Tier 2
-0.0732..
(0.0048)
EducatiodWork Tier 3
h632**+44)

1

h x i r of Children
c h i l d Under Age 5
Second Adult
Black

7

1

0.0025
-0.1 179**
0.2974**
-0.1608**

1(

1

dRisk 1
Ratio
1.087
1.224 1
0.929
0.7691

1 1'

0 . 0 0 m
(0.0041) 0.889
(0.0060) 1.346

I

(m

Nonmetropolitan County

1 score

14,185.79**
13,994.17**
374,604

~ o t aNumber
l
of Cases
censored Percentage
Average Spell Duration

1

1
1

Notes: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.0001
Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic
Research and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A&M
University.
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Table 4: Proportional Hazard Model of TANF Spell Duration for Cases Beginning New Spell from January
1997 to September 1999 for Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Counties in the State of Texas
Risk
Parameter
Standard
Independent Variable
Error
Ratio
Metropolitan Counties
State Time Limits
(0.0046)
1.070
0.0679**
Penalty Sanction
(0.0053)
1.216
0.1954**
EducatiodWork Tier 2
(0.0053)
0.922
-0.0816**
EducatiodWork Tier 3
Age
-0.0057**
Number of Children
Child Under Age 5
Second Adult
1
1.408
0.3425**
(0.0071)
Black
0.850
-0.1628**
(0.0054)
Hispanic
0.900
-0.1055**
(0.0053)
American Indian
0.974
(0.0368)
-0.0265
Asian
1.048
(0.021 1)
0.0467*
Medical Incapacity
0.638
-0.4487**
(0.0086)
The 87 Counties
1.159
(0.0081)
0.1474**
12,512.66**
Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald
Total Number of Cases
Censored Percentage
Average S ~ e lDuration
l

A
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Independent Variable

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Risk
Ratio

Nonmetropolitan Counties
State Time Limits
(0.0097)
1.129
0.1209**
Penalty Sanction
0.2086**
(0.0137)
1.232
EducatiodWork Tier 2
(0.01 11)
0.965
-0.0352*
EducatiodWork Tier 3
-0.2227**
(0.0100)
0.800
-0.0067**
(0.0005)
0.993
Age
Number of Children
(0.0038)
1.012
0.0121*
Child Under Age 5
0.907
(0.0093)
-0.0972**
1.216
Second Adult
(0.0110)
0.1954**
Black
(0.01 18)
0.854
-0.1578**
Hispanic
(0.0096)
0.94 1
-0.0606**
American Indian
(0.0688)
1.068
0.0659
Asian
(0.1326)
0.93 1
-0.071 3
Medical Incapacity
(0.0166)
0.717
-0.3330**
0.976
The 87 Counties
-0.0246*
(0.0 102)
Likelihood Ratio
2,025.80**
Score
1,998.01**
Wald
1,990.02**
72,353
Total Number of Cases
Censored Percentage
16.61
Average Spell Duration
6.01
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.0001 Source: Unpublished data at Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic
Research and Education, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A&M University.
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assistance services by existingcaseload recipients would be increasing.
During the period examined in this research, Texas operated its
TANF program under its federal waiver. The differences in the
implementation of reform measures in metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas resulted in a relatively uniform application of its
sanction penalties but a large difference in the provision ofjob services.
The disparity in the proportions of the caseloads in September 1999
receiving job assistance suggest that many families are leaving the
TANF caseload in rural areas without any job preparation services that
are available to clients in urban areas of the state. The consequence of
this disparity was mitigated by the geographic exemption from state
time limits for those families in the more remote areas of the state
during this period.
Empirically, families in nonmetropolitan areas are more likely
to be sanctioned and have longer spell durations, although these
differences from urban areas are relatively small compared to the other
independent effects. In the models examining the urban and rural
caseloads separately, the effects of lower human capital skills increased
the likelihood of being sanctioned at a faster rate in the nonmetropolitan
caseload. Taken together, these findings for the state caseload suggest
support for Moffitt's (1999) dual process caseload decline; cases with
higher human capital skills as well as cases with time limits and
sanctions are more likely to exit the caseload at faster rates.
In October 1999, Texas reauthorized its sanction policy but
began running the federal time clock concurrently with the state's
variable time limits. This began a hybrid system of the state and federal
requirements where time limited benefits accrued with monthlyreceipt
rather than the provision of work assistance. With the imposition of
federal time limits in October 1999, this suggests that many families in
rural areas will accumulate months on their lifetime federal time clock
without any job assistance or training programs available to assist them
in their transition from welfare. While Texas has begun to extend
services to counties initially classified as minimal service counties with
Rural Initiatives grants (THHSC 200 l), many of these programs have
yet to be implemented or even initiated, which means that many
families in rural areas may have over 24 months used on their federal
time clock before any employment assistance programs reach their
areas.
In 1996 when PRWORA was signed, many pundits predicted a
Published by eGrove, 2002
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"race to the bottom" among the states as they adhere to many of the
federal reform measures, such as the caseload reduction credit. By all
accounts, many of these dire warnings have not manifested.
Nonetheless, many states, such as Texas, have made substantial
tradeoffs in the service delivery models within the state, which results
in locational differences in the types of available services. As the
descriptive findings have shown, there is over a 40 percent gap between
urban and rural areas in the caseload proportions that began Texas' state
time limits and received any job assistance. In contrast, the sanctioning
policies were applied relatively uniformly across the state. These
locational differences between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas
suggest the potential for a rural disadvantage where families are
penalized for not abiding by the rules but provided little to no
assistance in the transition off of the welfare rolls.
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